




Symbolic Model Checking of Domain Models for Autonomous Spacecrafts


Charles Pecheur (RIACS / NASA Ames)

Model-Based Autonomy




Goal: "intelligent" autonomous spacecrafts

- cheaper (smaller ground control)
- more capable (delays, blackouts)
- General **reasoning engine** + application-specific **model**
- Use model to respond to unanticipated situations
- For planning, **diagnosis**
- Huge state space, reliability is critical



Livingstone

Remote Agent's model-based diagnosis sub-system



Courtesy Autonomous Systems Group, NASA Ames


Livingstone Models

inflow, outflow : {zero,low,high}

- concurrent transition systems (components)
- synchronous product
- enumerated types
=> finite state


Essentially \approx SMV model

+ nominal/fault modes,
commands/monitors (I/O),
probabilities on faults, ...



Courtesy Autonomous Systems Group, NASA Ames

*Diagnosis = find the most likely assumptions (modes)
that are consistent with the observations (commands/monitors)*





Large State Space?

- Example: model of ISPP = $7.16 \cdot 10^{55}$ states
- This is only the Livingstone model – a complete verification model could be
 - Exec driver (10-100 states)
 - x Spacecraft simulator (10^{55} states)
 - x Livingstone system (keeps history – $10^{n \cdot 55}$ states)
- Verify a system that analyzes a large state space!
- Approach: the model is the program
 - Verify it (using symbolic model checking)
 - Assume Livingstone correct (and complete)

Autonomy

Verification





Translator from Livingstone to SMV



- Co-developed with CMU (Reid Simmons)
- Similar semantics => translation is easy
- Properties in temporal logic + pre-defined patterns
- Initially for Livingstone 1 (Lisp),
upgraded to Livingstone 2 (C++/Java)

Principle of Operations

Lisp shell

```
(load "mpl2smv.lisp")  
;; load the translator  
;; Livingstone not needed!
```

```
(translate "ispp.lisp" "ispp.smv")  
;; do the translation
```

```
(smv "ispp.smv")  
;; call SMV  
;; (as a sub-process)
```

```
(defcomponent heater ...)  
(defmodule valve-mod ...)  
...  
(defverify  
  :structure (ispp)  
  :specification (all (globally ...)))
```


ispp.lisp

```
MODULE Mheater ...  
MODULE Mvalve-mod ...  
...  
MODULE main  
VAR Xispp: Mispp  
SPEC AG ...
```

ispp.smv

```
Specification AG ... is false as shown ...  
State 1.1: ...  
State 1.2: ...
```

SMV output




Simple Properties



- Supported by the translator:
 - syntax sugar
 - iterate over model elements (e.g. all component modes)
- Examples
 - Reachability (no dead code)
EF heater.mode = on
 - Path Reachability (scenario)
AG (s1 → EF (s2 & EF (s3 & EF s4)))




Probabilistic Properties



- Use probabilities associated to failure transitions
- Use order of magnitude: $-\log(p)$, rounded to a small integer
- Combine additively, OK for BDD computations
- Approximate – but so are the proba. values

heater.mode = overheat \rightarrow heater.proba = 2; ($p = 0.01$)
proba = heater.proba + valve.proba + sensor.proba;
SPEC AG (broken & proba < 3 \rightarrow EF working)


Functional Dependency



- Check that $y=f(x)$ for some unknown f
- Use universally quantified variables in CTL
= undetermined constants in SMV


$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{VAR } x_0, y_0 : \{a, b, c\}; \\ \text{TRANS next}(x_0) = x_0 \\ \text{TRANS next}(y_0) = y_0 \end{array} \right\} \approx \forall x_0, y_0$$
$$\text{SPEC } (\text{EF } x=x_0 \ \& \ y=y_0) \rightarrow (\text{AG } x=x_0 \rightarrow y=y_0)$$

- Limitation: counter-example needs two traces,
SMV gives only one
 \Rightarrow instantiate second half by hand, re-run SMV




Temporal Queries


- Temporal Query = CTL formula with a hole:
AG (? \rightarrow EF working)
- Search (canonical) condition for ? that satisfies the formula (computable for useful classes of queries)
- Recent research, interrupted (William Chan, †1999)
- Problem: visualize solutions (CNF, projections, ...)
- Core algorithm implemented in NuSMV (Wolfgang Heinle)
- Deceptive initial results, to probe further




SMV with Macro Expansion




- Custom version of SMV (Bwolen Yang, CAV 99)
- Eliminates variables by **Macro Expansion**:
 - analyzes static constraints of the model (invariants),
 - find dependent variables $x=f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$,
 - substitute $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ for x everywhere,
 - eliminate x from the set of BDD variables.
- For models with lots of invariants
=> useful for Livingstone models
- Full ISPP model in < 1 min, vs. SMV runs out of memory.




ISPP Model Statistics



- In Situ Propellant Production (ISPP)
= turn Mars atmosphere into rocket fuel (NASA KSC)
- Original model state = 530 bits (trans. = 1060 bits)
- Total BDD vars 588 bits
Macro expanded -209 bits
Reduced BDD vars 379 bits
- **Reachable state space** $7.16 \cdot 10^{55}$ = $2^{185.5}$
Total state space $1.06 \cdot 10^{81}$ = $2^{269.16}$
- Reachability of all modes (163):
29.14" CPU time in 63.6 Mb RAM




Diagnosis Properties




- Can fault F always be diagnosed?
(assuming perfect diagnosis and accurate model)
= is F unambiguously observable?
 $\forall \text{ obs0} . (\text{EF } F \ \& \ \text{obs}=\text{obs0}) \rightarrow (\text{AG } F \rightarrow \text{obs}=\text{obs0})$
- Similar to functional dependency
- obs = observable variables (many of them)
- Static variant (ignore transitions):
SAT on two states S, S' such that
 $F \ \& \ ! F' \ \& \ \text{obs}=\text{obs}'$

- Very recent (yesterday), with Alessandro Cimatti
- Can fault F be diagnosed knowing the last n steps?
- Apply SAT to:



- Variants are possible (e.g. fork at $n-1$ instead of 0)




Diagnosis Properties (cont'd)




- Does it work?
 - Computational cost of extra variables
- Has it been done?
 - Similar work in hardware testability?
- Is it useful?
 - It is unrealistic to expect all faults to be immediately observable (e.g. valve closed vs. stuck-closed)
 - What weaker properties? Are they verifiable?
- **To be explored**



Summary



- Verification of model-based diagnosis:
 - Space flight => safety critical.
 - Huge state space (w.r.t. fixed command sequence).
- Focus on models (the model is the program)
- Quite different from executable programs
 - Loose coupling, no threads of control, passive.
 - Huge but shallow state spaces.
- Symbolic model checking is very appropriate
- Verify well-formedness + validity w.r.t. hardware
- Verify suitability for diagnosis: to be explored



Thank You